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From the perspective of European Ńeighbourhood Policy (ENP), the year of 2009 
was looked forward to as a possible tuming point in terms of expanding its eastem 
dimcnsion. In the first half of this year, the EU presidency was passcd over to Czech 
Republic, in the second half Sweden will take over. Both countries rank themselves 
among the member states, which participate in the activities of deepening the rela- 
tions with states eastward from the EU, i.e. the states of former Soviet Union. In 
2008, Sweden joined Poland in initiatirig the project of so-called Eastem Partnership 
and as the presiding country had a chance to bolster this concept fundamentalły. In 
case of CR - a subject to prc-1989 Soviet sphere of influence and experienced and 
prinćiple actor in European “Eastem policy,” this wouldbe a logical activity. Owing 
to the this all, sińce its early preparatory stages Czech presidency has been perceived 
as major opportunity to further building of mechanisms of assistancc, aid and coop- 
eration with the states of Eastem Europę and Caucasian area.
Some facts of Czech presidency, however, deviate from these original notiohs. 
This article attempts to briefly analyze the Czech presidency and Czech attitude in 
generał, iitilizing some historie trends and parallels with other states. This analysis 
should contribute to a morę profound comprehension of some peeuliarities, curiosi- 
ties, as well as the afore-mentioned inconsistency.
Conventional attitude of Czech politics and society to European integration 
and to the “East”
Firstly, the “Czech experience” with European integration or Czech politics’relation 
to the countries eastwards from EU must be delineated.1 After 1989, Czech Republic
- 1 One.cannot refer to purcly Czech cxpcricncc though; in generał this can be applied to all candidates. 
Naturally, in this respect CR had the most in common with Visegrad countries. Numerous aspects are neverthelcss 
typical for Czech milieu, which will be duły emphasized in the tcxt.
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and other countries of former Eastem bloc became part of so far the biggest long- 
term project of so-called Eastem enlargement of EU. Already at the veiy beginnitig, 
this process proved to be the most challenging and most discusscd of all the enlar­
gement stages, that is in context of EU as well as global politics.2 The situation of 
candidates called for a creation of very specific mechanisms, which would on one 
hand proceed from the existing experience of European institutions, on the other 
hand necessarily responding sensitively to the needs of indivjdual countries. For the 
authors of pre-accession programs, these needs were an unheard of concem sińce 
; the Western democratic states integrated into EU until then were not familiar with 
the real state of śociety and economics of post-Soviet area. Their approach to can­
didates during early association talks and creation of related aid programs can thus 
be called “on the hoof leaming.” On the other hand, states of Central and Eastem 
Europę, which meanwhiló became part of EU, gained subśtantial experience with 
EU instruments for forming any kind bf partnerśhip with third countries, in whose 
position they themselves were during pre-accession activities. At the same time, they 
remained aware of their own past when “on their way to Europę” they had to over- 
come diffleulties in many respects so similar to the problems of states eastward from 
the current EU. For the initiators of Eastem Partnerśhip, it was this prereąuisite what 
made the Czech presidency no less than promisihg even beforc it actually started. '
A crucial problem of Eastem enlargement was new “Eastem” EU ’ frontier.
' However, this very debato did not affcct Czech rcpublic much; it was the only candi- : 
date state not being in a position of “bufFer’’ state, that is state partially bordering on 
EU non-inembers. This fact did much to influence Czcch pcrccption of new EU proj- 
ects eastwards. Czech political elites traditionally consider these projects second- 
rate within “European” policy - as compared to essential matterś of EU orientation 
and working - a fact determined among others by the lack of necessity to deal with 
relations to ńon-member neighbours. Vice versa, all the other states participating in 
the Eastem enlargement consider this problem crucial sińce the first moment of their 
accession because it affects them directly.3
For the sake of completcness, let us mention the crucial importance of this 
type of debate on Poland, which through its EU entry should become a “bridge” be- 
tween the West and the East. Polish as well as CSFR/CR entry was strongly endorsed 
especially by Gennany  ^that is Chancellor Kohl, who after somewhat contentious 
German unification worked bard to make sure that Gennan would not border on 
EU non-members. German initiative meant a signińcant impulse in the process of 
Eastem enlargement and among other things demonstrated the associated states that 
not only the backing by EU central institutions, but also by individual states or gróup 
of states may be of great importance, even though these supporters follow their own 
interests.4
' * Putting aside for iiistancc British expcricnce wjth rcpcatcd French vctD , largcly a conseąuence of pcrsonal 
bias of one man rather than persistent and widely-discusscd probiera of British entry ona generał lcvel. ' .
s This perception by EU peripheral states was further boistered by their eatry to Schengen area.
‘ A merc brcaking point for CHE candidate Countries was ihc summit under German prcsidcncy in Essen in 
. . Dcćember 1994 where the Pre-accession strategy for associated countries was presented. For his supportof Eastem 
enlargement, Kohl even got to certain conflict with French president Mitterand, who expressed his concems and
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Certain indicator of Czech politics’ relation to Eastem states and the East 
in generał would be the majority views and positionsin Czcch society. The fali 
of Soviet empire and emancipation from Soviet bloc meant an absolute breaking 
with anything resembling the recently finished era. This tum ąuickly transformed 
into rejecting of all Eastem, disregarding the extent of “Eastem” historie context of 
Czech statehood, including the recently past history. Thus, within Czech society cer­
tain middle class mainstream preserved. This position which could be ąuite openly 
termed “sińce now on only to the West” was widely rcflccted by Czech politics as 
well as Czech science.5 ; .
All the afore-depicted aspeets of “Czcch cxperience” and Czech pereeption 
of the East must be taken into account at the moment of starting any circumstantial 
research on Czech EU presidency and its preparations. Next to this generał level 
related more or less to the majority of Czech society, the deveIopnient of Czech 
presidency was also conditioned by the political mindsets of individual actors. Czech 
political scene-even in terms of fóreign,policy- is distinctive for its high rate of 
inconsistency.* This inconsistency is also the result of political parties’ rivalry among 
other things. These do not assume foreign policy positions doctrinally, but more of- 
ten in response to the current mood of their political opponents.7
■ A significant aspect of presidency preparations was the mounting conflict of 
govemment and president Vaclav Klaus, which took place largely.on foreign policy 
Ievel. This conflict started already with ĆSSD govemment in the office, but after 
ODS took up, this discrepancy not only failed to be resolved, it even mounted and on 
the whole became a neuralgic point of Czech presidency and its preparations; These 
reąuisites are also to be corisidered while rethinking the Czech activities in EU.
Preparation, priorities and beginning of Czech presidency vs. EU Eastern 
policy : :
Preparations for Czech presidency were started by the second administration of Mi­
rek Topolanek symbolically in January 2007; at that time facing the vote of censure. 
Unlike other EU countries’ practice of having Ministry for European affairs, there 
was no śuch resort introduced in Czech govemment. It was supplied for by a strange
fears of “dilution” of Europę and of Europę becoming impovcrished as a conseąuence of ill-considered admission 
ofnewmembers. ; .
■ ■ ’ Among others, ońe can mentioń restricting or eveń closing down of scientific institutions specialized in 
Eastem Europę. “Intermezzo’’ or even “interregnum", which thus resiilted in Czech .‘.'Eastem” studies affects and 
conditions the Czech bonds with Eastem states and societies and their pereeption until today. ;
6 These fundamental disagreements in foreign policy are in fact Czcch particularity, which kept revealing
itself even over the period of association and preparation for EU membership. Unlike other states, here the supporl/ 
non-suppoit were during all the association process almost equa]ly loud, which to certain degree lowered the bar- 
gaining position and power of CR. ' '
7 An example would be the ÓDS (ObEanskd demokraticki strana) and ĆSSD (Ćeska strana socialnfi
demokratickś) relation to two principal topics of Czech foreign policy - Treaty of Lisbon and radar base - during 
and after the 2006 elections. ODS (or better to say its part) during the preparation for presidency changcd its mind on 
“Lisbon” to “soft Yes.” As opposed to that, ĆSSD, which still as a governing party in the pre-elećtion period initiated 
the first radar talks and negotiations with USA, started to oppose this issue after the elections, while ODS became 
a sound supporter of radar.'
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and transitory office of vicc-prcmier for European affairs,8 given in charge to senator 
and former ambassador to USAAlexandr Vondra. These two politicians also became 
unambiguous leaders of the prcsidcncy preparations.9 .
Presidency program and priorities were officiallyintroduced on 6 January 2009, 
śix days after its commencement.10 The central concepts of program were termed 
“Three E’s”: Economy, Energetics, Europę in the world. This summary insinuated 
that the presidency’s primary aim is to react to deteriorating economic crisis which in 
the preceding years heavily afflicted the integrated Europę and slowed down or even 
stooped its economic growth. The second “E” would stand for a shift in EU energetic 
needs’ solution. When the priorities were created, few expected how highly topical 
the energetics matter will tum at the beginning of presidency. An onset of “natural. 
gas crisis” not only temporarily paralyzed EU eastem countries but also brought into 
the open the third “E" - Europę in the world. In terms of relations-building among 
EU and the other countries, Czech priority sińce the very beginning was a solution to 
EU-Russia relation; doing so CR merely picked up the threads of antecedent presi- 
dencies. A prelimiriary problem in January 2009 was naturally settling the dispute 
and reconciling the situation after the Russian military intervention in Georgia. This 
matter moreover proved the above-noted disagreement of Govemment (or premier 
Topolanek) and president Klaus - Czech president being one of the few European 
statesmen indirectly lent support to Moscow in Russian-Georgian conflict.
The onset of gas crisis not only launched a new dimension in EU-Russia rela- 
tions but resulted in overall updating of the topics delineated by Czech presidency 
as essential in the “Europę in the world” topie. In fact, it originally comprised three 
geographic areas considered by Czech govemment the most important in terms of 
relations with EU: Eastem Europę, the Western Balkans and transatlantic relations. 
One can say that a truły unexpected agenda related to gas crisis and issues related 
to it - not only in terms of Europe’s energetic futurę, but also the very organization 
of Eastem Europę - resulted in focus on “Eastem” matters, that is at the expense of 
Czech presidency’s interest in other afore-mentioned areas. This holds at least for 
first months of Czech presidency.
This is, in fact, how the scope for further developing and elaborating of Eastem 
Partnerśhip project activities came into being. Czech goyemment reflected on this 
initiadve sińce it was proclaimed as Polish-Swedish project by European Commis- 
sion. Although initially - as suggested above - it should not play any major role, 
Czech presidency in fact could not “evade” it. On the other hand, it must be noted 
that this project was still far from being insignificant for Czech govemment. The 
interest at first did not stem from a special concept of new cooperation of EU and 
Eastem countries however; paradoxically, it arose rather from long-range “Euro­
pean” policy of the government’s strongest party ODS. This policy is based on what 
is nowadays traditional approach of numerous European conservative parties - that 
is “prevent further deepening of integration by being more active in its enlarge-
" The agenda of this office would however shrink to no more than EU presidency and its preparation.
? Premier and vice-premier are ODS members,
10 ‘Tiskova konference: PFedstavenf programu a priorit cz pres 6. ledna 2009’, al <http://www.vlada.cz/cz/ 
media-centrum/tiskove-konference/tk—predstaveni-programu-a-priorit-cz-prcs-5]281>.
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ment.” This attitude resembles the British policy sińce its very EC entry; after Czech 
admission this position was taken over by a substantial part of ODS.11 If the Czech 
presidency attempted to implement some new steps towards establishing new rela­
tions with Eastem states, then it did so also partly under this influence.
The original motto of Czech presidency before its commencement should be 
“We will dulcify Europę” and no one was left hesitating that conceals at least a hint 
of traditional Czech “eurorealism” if not even “europessimism”.12 Later, however, 
as a conseąuence of above-noted eyents, it was reevaluated and changed to “Europę 
without barriers.” Czech presidency thereby proclaimed the necessity to break down 
the existing obstacles which within the Common market hinder a truły free move- 
ment of all four liberties.13 In correspondence with the project of Eastem Partnerśhip, 
entering the EU market should be graduaily made possible for all the participating 
states, which can meet the demands set by the Union.
Long before Czech presidency Ycommencement, its graduaily evolving inter­
est in Eastem dimension of ENP created apprehension that in long term perspective 
CR need not be able to defend this course on EU level. An immediate forerunner of 
Czech presidency over EU was France, the foreign policy of Which is largely de- 
termined by president, currently more than noticeable Nicolas Sarkozy. He made it 
more than elear already during his mandate that he did not consider CR an equivalent 
successor and by numerous diplomatic acts tried to do maximum to weaken Czech 
influence during presidency.14 That is why at least the first weeks of Czech presi­
dency were subjected to a would-be “surveillance” of Elysian pałace over Straka 
academy.15 ■-■■- ;v  v;.; -
During its presidency, France became an instigator of so-called Mediterranean 
union, an instrument to bolster the EU neighbourhood policy with states around 
Mediterranean Sea. This enterprise logically ran into conflict with deepening the 
Eastem policy, because amplifying both ENP dimensions at the same time - the 
Southern as well as the Eastem - was beyond the strength of any presidency as well 
as EU agenda in generał. Even though at least this type of conflict or constraint by 
France was merely expected, nothing like this actually happened, French attempts 
on “riyal surveillance" over Czech presidency rather surfaced in solving up-to-date 
problems like new war in Gaza area or the above-noted gas crisis. Seen from this 
perspective and as far as the Eastem dimension of Neighbourhood policy is con- 
cemed, Czech presidency remained spared from the toughest French attacks
To conclude this it can be noted that EU Eastem policy or the project of Eastem 
Partnerśhip ultimately found its scope in Czech presidency’s agenda, even though
11 It should be noted that sińce ODS itselF entered the European Parliament, it negotiated the eventuality to 
form an “eurosceptic” club with the British Conservativcs.
11 Note the deliberate use of teim “Europessimism" instead of the e)cpected “Eurosccpticism", the meaning 
of which lately and unjustifiably sbifted towards almost vulgar designation for those, who are not open to every new 
integration aetivity.
i] From Czech perspecli ve, the concem was some EU countries ’ obstructions with admittance of new mcm- 
ber states’ labour force on their labour market. ,
“ Among all others we can mention Sarkozy’s comments on the stability of Topolanek’s govemment and 
Czech political scenę as a whole or frequent reiterating of the fact that CR is not yet a member of Eurozone, etc.
15 French-Czech relations and/or confrontations espccially in terms of EU 's extemal policy will be discussed 
in more details in the following parts of the tcxt.
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not a fully privileged scope, A major tum in its favour. is clearly represented by gas 
crisis and the matter of futurę relations with Russia. However it eąually holds that 
the most activities related to Eastem Partnership were pre-arranged by the European 
Commission in cooperation with its instigators and Czech presidency was supposed 
to do alittle more than just supervising that everything goes as it should and could 
not exert major influence over their direction.
The progress of Czech presidency in terms of activities in Eastern Partnership 
dimension ■:
The preceding chapters were an anaiysis of certain generał prereąuisites of Czech 
presidency for activities in ENP’s Eastem dimension development. At the same time, 
some concrete preliminary problems were outlined - the so-called long-term and 
short-term conditions affecting Czech presidency’s relation to the new project of 
Eastem Partnership. The last part of this contribution will be devoted to the anaiysis 
of the course of presidency and its actions within the examined initiative.
As suggested carlier, the planned activities of Eastem Partnership agenda were 
integrated in Operational Program of Czech presidency,16 which did not introduce 
much more than a paraphrase of the already. prepared program of European Com­
mission. In terms of EU foreign relations, the project of Eastem Partnership is quot- 
ed oii the very first place, beforc the relations to Russia, transatlantic relations etc. 
Formulation of specific steps is however somewhat yague and not presenting elear 
solution to some of the problematic aspeets. An emphasis is naturally put primarily 
on Ukrainę, in terms of EU relations primary of all the six states participating in the 
project.17 Czech presidency intends to continue negotiating “new and more profound 
agreement on mutual relations.”1? In case of Moldavia, the negotiations of similar 
agreement are still to be commenced. And this is where we witness the. first of the . 
whole array of conseąuences of the above-noted vagueness: as what is missing is 
a slightest reference to Moldayian territorial integrity, which could do much compli- 
catc the planned negotiations. ;
South Caucasian countries are quoted here as a somewhat peculiar group; in 
terms of Eastem Partnership after all. The dominant features here should be new 
agreements producing a greater stability of the whole region, which is particularly 
delicate for EU in terms of its energetic safety. The primary goal then is a solution to 
Georgian crisis while “observing the principals of sovereignty and territorial integ-:, 
rity of Georgia.” Similar terms and conditions are pursued by the part of Operational 
program devoted to relations to Russia, where the countries included in Eastem Part-
14 'PracoYtu program ieskćho pfedscdnictvf, at <http://www.eu2009.cz/cz/czech-presidency/programme- 
and-prioritics/program-a-priority-478>.
11 The term "primary" is used here for denoting the position among the given countries; in terms of the gen­
erał view of EU-Ukraine relations, it would definitely seem ovenated. ■', . .. ;
"  *Pracavniprogramieskehopfedscdnictvi’ ,p . 2t.
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nership are specifically mentioned as an “important theme in terms of relations to 
Russia” in the area of EU’s energetic safety.19
The separate and ultimately most complicated chapter of Eastem Partnerśhip 
would be-Belarus. Czech govemment and media traditionally; conceive.:it  as “the 
last totalitarian state in Europę”, which would appear as somewhat strict assessment 
when compared to other usually more benevolent European countries. On can say 
that president Lukasenko did not see Czech presidency as contributive to his coun- 
try ’s relations to EU; this would prove true later one in the course of the presidency. 
The program of presidency then speaks of the “gradual development” of EU-Belarus 
relations and opening a constructive dialogue, provided that Belarus govemment 
would assist in “encouraging the civic society in Belarus.”20 ^
After successfully entatigling the January gas crisis - although reaching of the 
. agreement left many ąuestions of futurę development opened - in February Czech 
republic won praise by European Commission’s president J.M. Barroso, who sug- 
gested that unlike the others, Czech presidency had to cope with extremely “brisk 
: start.”21 This reaction and similar on es by other European politicians could be one of 
the causesofSarkozy’s Spring tempering of “anti-Czech offensive,” Owing also to 
that, Czech govemment would enjoy a lot more favourable conditions for continua-
■ tion with the presidency’s negotiation.
A large part of further negotiations related to Eastem Partnerśhip was more : 
or less bound to the solution of gas crisis’ consequences. Thus already iń January, 
premier Topolanek visited Budapeśt and held talks with Georgian and Azerbaydzhan 
representatives on the perspectivcs of strengthening EU’s energetic safety, and in 
Polish Wrocław discussed the Russo-Ukraine dispute over natural gas supply22 with 
Polish and Ukrainian presidents Kaczynsky and Juscenko.
, A prove to the rising importance of “Eastem ąuestion” for Czech govemment 
was inclusion of Eastem Partnerśhip among the key topics of Spring Brussels sum­
mit on 19-20 March.23 That is where and when the new anti-crisis measures and fur- 
ther actions over Eastem Partnerśhip were agreed on. Firstly, the Council confirmed  ^
the preparation of Eastem Partnerśhip summit on 7 May 2009. At the same time, the 
way of forming these relations was set: through a deepening of bilateral relations 
to integrate these countries into a multilatcral framework, which would accelerate 
’ refórms, ćonvergence of legał regiilations and further economic integratioris. Finally, 
the Council called upon Commission as well as present and succeeding presidency 
to make progress in effecting the partnerśhip; the Commission was supposed to pres­
ent in due time a report on the first ycar of projeefs duration.24 r
Despite the positive conclusions drawn by European Council, a persisting 
problem of the project of Eastem Partnerśhip would be a matter of Belamsian par-
^Ibid. V, V.  ; 1 :V . T ;V'
Ibid. : : - '
ż 11‘Ćeskćpf edsednictvi vpo!o£ase-pfeliledvyznamnycIi akci’,at<http;//www. vlada.cz/cz/media-centnim/■
: ' tema/ccskć-prcdsedńictń-v-polocase'"prehled'Vyznamnych-akcL-55784>. ■ "  
l: Ibid. :
a Besides the said topie, the others were economic situations, ćnergctics and climate ćhanges.
■' w 'Evropskirada v Bruselu 19. a 20. bfczna 2009. Zavfiry pfedsednictvt’, at <http://www!consi!ium.europa. 
eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/CS/ec/106808.pd£>..' : ; ■
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ticipation. Numerous issuesrelatedtoCR-Belarus and EU-Belarus relations were re- 
solved already three days before opening the summit by the Council for extemal re­
lations presidedoverby Kareł Schwarzenberg, whichblocked the restriction on visa 
for some Belarusian representatives for anothcr nine months. However, along with 
it the restrictive measures taken against Belarus were extended for another twelve 
months, after which the Council would inspect the situation in Belarus again.25 Prob­
lem with Belarus then became one of the most pressing and delicate in the course 
of preparations of Summit for Eastem Partnership, which was planned for Prague,' 
7 May 2009. ‘ '
i  This summit’s preparations took place during April under the influence of two 
events or problems. In the first place, it was an unexpected and unforeseen Czech 
Parliament’s vote of no confidcncc to Mirek Topola»ek’s goyemment and arrange- 
ments for new caretaker government among others by the, main opposition party,; 
which madę no secret of having totally different views of presidency conduction. 
The second problem was an emotive statement by Belarusian president Lukascnko 
on behałf of Czech presidency that he himself will not participate in the Summit and 
that Czech republic should not be entrust to organize it. Not only premier - at that 
time in demise - became part of this affair, but also president Klaus, whose effort to 
exert influence over foreign policy was described earlier in this text. That is to say, 
Lukasenko’s finał “no” to the Prague summit was expressed after Klaus’s words that 
he “would not shake Lukasenko’s hand in Praguc.”
■The actual Summit for Eastem Partnership on 7 May was the last activity of 
Topolanek’s govemment, which was two days later succeeded by the caretaker gov- 
emment of Jan Fischer. Although this summit rcachcd some premised decisions, 
it was equally marked by an absence of leading European politicians. Major prob­
lem, of course, was nonattendance of the aboye-mentioned Łukasenko, who was 
ncvcrthclcss represented by Belarusian first vice-premier. The head of the:state of 
Moldavia did not attend the summit either and his place was taken by the Minis­
ter of Foreign affairs and European integration. Some anticipated guests from EU 
countries failed to arrive too; most notably the British and Italian premier or French 
president. The absence of the Iatter was however a more or less logical outeome of 
the relations depictcd above.
The negotiations’ finał act, the so-called Joint declaration of Prague Eastem 
Partnership summit is a culmination of not only the first preparator)' phase of this 
project but also the activities of Czech presidency under Topolanek administration in 
generał. The declaration’s message picks up the threads of fonner plans and agree- 
ments resulting from the project and one can say that the summifs major importance 
was a personal contact of the representatives of all EU countries and six countries 
included in this project. AH agreed ón heading towards multilaterał framework for 
EU relations to the given countries, which would simultaneously act as a forum for 
information exchange. The Eastem countries would thereby report on their progress 
in transformation and reforms; that would.make it possible for the EU. members to
■IS ‘Tiskovdzprdva: 2933 zaseddniRady- VnfijSi vztahy, Bnisel 16,bfezna 2009’, at<http://www.consilium. 
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/CS/gena/i 06700.pdf*.
potentially leam them a bit more in the prbcess. Work groups would be set up In 
support of individual reform topics. Provided the problems relate tó Eastern Partner­
ship, the Eastem states would be authorized to participate in the concrete projects 
and negotiations of EU. EU would endorse that all by providing increased financial 
support and focusing on the encouragement of modemization and investing activi- 
tics in the given countries.26
Eastem Partnership was temied successful and considering the situation on 
Czech political scene the successor and continuator would be the next presiding 
state, Sweden.
Concluding remarks
For this study was for better comprehension of the course of Czech presidency started 
by detailed anaiysis of Czech positions towards the East, the conclusion only very 
briefly summarizes the course of presidency under Topolanek’s administration.
Following the problematic, by gas crisis affected, though more or less suc- 
cessful step into EU presidency, Czech govemment had to focus quite closely on the 
Eastem problem. Considering the goals set in advanced by the EU institutions, Czech 
govemment can be said to meet the demands and expectations and accomplish most 
of the planned actions, most importantly the Prague summit. Nevertheless, although 
there existed a strong need to put emphasis on Eastem problem and many of them 
were mentioned aboye, one has to note this project’s lack of something what can be 
termed a “Czech tracę”, that is a distinctive and peculiar ideological contribution for 
the concept of ENP’s Eastem dimension. Czech presidency under Mirek Topolanek 
is still being assessed as rather positive; however, the finał assessment can be made 
only after all the projects’ preparations are finished and the real operation of Eastem 
Partnership is commenced.
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Summary
This contribution deals with the problem of Czech presidency’s EU activities under 
the administration of Mirek Topolanek, more specifically activities in the so-called : 
Eastem Partnership project, a brand new dimension of European Neighbourhood 
Policy. In addition to the appraisal of purely govemmental activities led perhaps by 
handling the gas crisis of January 2009 and its conseąuences or the preparation and 
management of Eastem Partnership summit in Prague, an emphasis is put on a more 
generał elucidation of the. position of Czech politics and public towards the Eastem 
Europę or post-Soviet area problem. Although Europę perceives Czech Republic as 
a country generally more than favourable to Eastem European countries and linked 
to them through a common experience Soviet dictatorship, the reality is somewhat 
different. Czech govemment in fact did little more than follow the beaten track, tra-
■ 26 ‘SpolcĆnd deklarace z praźskeho Summitu o yychodnim partncrstvl, Praha 7. kv£tna 2009’, at <http:// 
www.consilium.europa.e'u/iiedocs/ciris_data/docs/pressdata/CS/er/107617.pdf>.
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ced out by Poland and Sweden as the project’s instigators and European Commission 
in particular. One can therefore state a lack of particular “Czech tracę” in the project, 
although it remains disputable whether leaving such tracę was possible and feasible 
at all. Despite certain negatives in Czech relations to European East in generał, an 
overall assessment tums up to be rather neutral - with regards to indeed rather Iow. 
contribution of own conceptions but with respect to meeting the demands and ac- 
complishing of all major pre-designed and pre-assigned tasks.
